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Abstract 
 
Are public sector workers in Ireland paid more than private sector 
employees, when such differences in productivity-related personal 
attributes and job characteristics are controlled for? We estimate 
that in 2001 the premium enjoyed by public servants was about 13 
per cent. We find that the premium, is significantly bigger for 
those near the bottom of the earnings distribution than for those 
near the top, was significantly bigger for women than men in the 
mid-1990s but not at the end of the 1990s, and does not vary 
significantly across different levels of educational attainment. We 
estimate the premium for 2001 to be not significantly different 
from that estimated for 1994 despite this period a period of 
exceptionally rapid output and employment growth, and 
correspondingly sharp tightening of labour market conditions in 
the Irish economy. The most remarkable difference between our 
results and those of other researchers for other countries relates to 
the absolute size of the premium. A number of possible 
explanations for this difference are discussed. 
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Public-Private Wage Differentials in Ireland, 1994-2001 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Public sector pay is a matter of considerable policy interest. At the 
macroeconomic level, the public sector pay bill is a large element 
of government expenditure, accounting for up to 70 per cent of 
general government consumption spending in some OECD 
countries (see Jurges (2001)). As such, public sector pay is an 
important driver of the overall tax burden. 
 
At the microeconomic level, rates of pay in the public sector have 
an important bearing on the recruitment, retention and motivation 
of public servants and, by extension, on the quality of public 
services. At the same time, public sector pay rates may influence 
rates of pay in the private sector and in this way too affect the 
international competitiveness of the economy. 
 
Reflecting these concerns, the design of public sector pay 
determination systems is an ongoing preoccupation of policy-
makers. The challenge is to identify and implement mechanisms 
that are capable of delivering outcomes that meet both efficiency 
and equity criteria. Consequently, recent developments in this 
field, in Ireland and elsewhere, have sought to institute 
arrangements that link rates of pay in the public sector more 
directly to private sector rates.  
 
In tandem with these developments, an international body of 
research has emerged which focuses on the operation of public 
sector labour markets. An important strand of that research has 
sought to quantify public-private sector wage differentials, to 
explore their pattern across the earnings distribution, educational 
attainment levels and occupations, and to analyse their movement 
over time.  
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This paper is part of that strand of research and, as far as 
methodology is concerned, draws its inspiration from it. To that 
extent, it is concerned with simply applying a well-tried set of 
econometric techniques to the analysis of public-private sector 
earnings differentials in Ireland, focusing on the period from 1994 
to 2001.  However, there are aspects of the Irish experience, 
specifically its economic performance during the 1990s and 
institutional features of its pay bargaining system, that make an 
extension of this research to the Irish case a matter of especial 
interest.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the 
economic and institutional background against which public sector 
pay has evolved in Ireland over the past decade or so. In Section 3 
we discuss some of the contributions to the recent international 
literature on public-private sector earnings differentials. In Section 
4 we describe the dataset we use to analyse public-private sector 
wage differentials in Ireland. In Section 5 we report our main 
results, and in Section 6 we summarise our main findings and 
draw some conclusions.        
 
2. The Irish Context 
 
The Irish economy experienced rapid growth of output and 
employment during the 1990s. Between 1993 and 2001 real GDP 
doubled while GNP increased at an average annual rate of almost 
8 per cent in real terms. Over the same period, total employment in 
the economy increased by a cumulative 45 per cent, or at an 
annual average rate of almost 5 per cent (Table 1). 
 
The principal counterpart of this vigorous expansion of 
employment was an increase in the labour force which, thanks to a 
combination of strong natural increase, rising female participation 
rates and the emergence of net inward migration, rose by 3 per 
cent per annum on average between 1993 and 2001 (Table 1). 
Unemployment also declined sharply, with the unemployment rate 
falling from 15.7 per cent in 1993 to 3.6 per cent in early 2001. 
 
Table 1: Labour force trends, Ireland, 1993 and 2001 
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(000s) 1993 2001 
Total Employment 1,183 1,717 
Unemployment 220 65 
Labour Force 1,403 1,782 
Unemployment Rate (%) 15.7 3.6 
Source: Budgetary and Economic Statistics, Department of Finance, Ireland. 
 
Some of the credit for Ireland’s economic performance during the 
1990s has been given to the so-called system of “social 
partnership” that has been an integral part of the country’s 
institutional architecture throughout the period. This system brings 
together the government and organisations representing employees 
and employers in a policy-oriented dialogue, the purpose of which 
is to find common ground in relation to social and economic 
objectives and the means of attaining them. The main outcome of 
the system has been a series of three-year programmes setting out 
agreed policies across a range of issues1. 
 
At the core of each of these partnership programmes has been a 
centralised wage agreement, characterised by broadly similar pay 
increases across the public and private sectors. Government has 
participated in these agreements, not only in its capacity as 
employer, but also in its role as fiscal authority. This has allowed 
the wage agreements to incorporate commitments by government 
in relation to income tax reductions.  
 
In simple terms, the logic behind the proposition that social 
partnership played a key role in the expansion of the Irish 
economy during the Celtic Tiger era runs as follows: partnership 
permitted tax reductions which facilitated wage moderation which 
in turn improved cost competitiveness and boosted output and 
employment. Of course, proponents of the social-partnership 
model claim other conduits of causation as well, such as the 
positive effects of partnership on the industrial relations climate 
 
1 These programmes and the periods to which they applied were as follows. The 
Programme for National Recovery (1988-1990); The Programme for Economic and 
Social Progress (1991-1993); The Programme for Competitiveness and Work (1994-
1996); Partnership 2000 (1997-2000); and The Programme for Prosperity and Fairness 
(2000-2002). The current programme, Sustaining Progress, covers the period 2003-
2005. All of these programmes are published by Government Publications, Stationery 
Office, Dublin.   
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and its contribution to the predictability of labour costs. The point 
is that, whatever the conduit and whatever the logic, the belief that 
social partnership is a valuable performance-enhancing institution 
is a very strong one in policy-making circles2.  
 
Undoubtedly, reductions in income tax, through their effect on 
labour supply, played a role in ensuring low rates of wage inflation 
in the Irish economy, at least in the early Celtic Tiger years. 
However, by the late 1990s, tightening labour market conditions 
had started to exert clear upward pressure on wage settlements. 
Increasingly, wage increases exceeded the norm set out in the 
centralised agreement. For example, Partnership 2000 – the 
programme that covered the period from 1997 through 1999 – 
provided for average annual increases of 2.2 per cent in basic pay 
across the public and private sectors, but by 1999 actual increases 
in earnings across many areas of the economy were running at 
over 6 per cent. Amongst construction workers, wage inflation was 
running at double-digit rates by 1999. 
 
Against this background a number of concerns emerged on the 
part of public sector employees and employers. One was that 
public sector workers were being left behind in pay terms by their 
private sector counterparts. This perception appears to have been 
based more on anecdotal evidence than on the available statistical 
evidence3. Nonetheless, it helped to create a sense of grievance 
amongst public sector workers, and also raised concerns about the 
 
2 A fairly typical view is the following from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Ms. Mary Harney T.D.:  
“Social partnership has been a major factor underpinning Ireland’s economic and 
social progress since the late 1980s. It has played a vital role in increasing employment 
… It has helped deliver sustained and sustainable increases in our standards of living. 
Above all, it has contributed to our dynamism and our confidence that we can 
successfully tackle common problems.” (Speech to Manpower Ireland Group European 
Business Leaders’ Breakfast, Dublin, April 2002.) 
3 Irish CSO data show that between 1996 and 2000, for example, average weekly 
earnings increased at an annual average rate of 4.9 per cent for public sector workers. 
The equivalent rates of increase for industrial workers and employees of banks, 
insurance companies and building societies were 5 per cent and 4.1 per cent 
respectively. All of these groups experienced far lower rates of increase than 
construction workers: between 1996 and 2000 skilled construction workers enjoyed 
average weekly earnings’ growth of over 10 per cent per annum.  
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capacity of organisations in the public service to recruit, retain and 
motivate staff. 
 
At the same time there was growing disenchantment with the 
existing public sector pay determination system. This was a 
system that theoretically provided for most rates of pay to be 
benchmarked against the private sector, with relativities within the 
public sector supposedly playing a modest supporting role. In 
practice, however, the system had evolved to the point where there 
were comparatively few grades whose pay was determined by 
direct reference to private sector comparators, and a great number 
of grades where internal relativities were the main determinants4. 
The resulting system had become rigid and inflexible, militated 
against the discrete treatment of individual grades and 
occupations, and had an inherent tendency to generate wage-wage 
spirals. 
 
Against this background, the Irish government, together with the 
social partners, established the Public Service Benchmarking Body 
(PSBB) in July 2000. The purpose of the PSBB was to examine 
pay and jobs in the public sector for those grades not covered by 
the Buckley Review Group5, and to make recommendations in 
relation to rates of pay based, according to the Body’s terms of 
reference, on ‘in-depth and comprehensive research and analysis 
of pay levels across the private sector’. 
 
The background to the establishment of the PSBB is dealt with 
more fully in O’Leary (2002). For present purposes, one aspect of 
its mandate is especially deserving of note, namely the scope of 
the exercise. While it was not asked to examine every single 
public sector grade, the number of grades that did come directly 
within its remit covered 145,000 public sector employees or over 
 
4 Amongst the grades where remuneration was explicitly benchmarked to the private 
sector were those at the very top of the public-sector hierarchy. Pay rates for these 
grades have been determined for many years now by the Review Body on Higher 
Remuneration in the Public Sector (the “Buckley Review Group”). The most recent 
report of this group was published in 2000 (Government Publications, the Stationery 
Office, Dublin). 
5 See previous footnote. 
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60 per cent of the total. There is no international precedent that we 
are aware of for a benchmarking exercise of this scale or scope.  
 
The PSBB reported in June 2002. It recommended pay increases 
for every grade it reviewed, ranging from 3 per cent in the case of 
laboratory technicians and third-level lecturers to 25 per cent for 
certain grades of paramedic, and averaging just under 9 per cent 
overall. The cost of implementing its recommendations is 
estimated at €1.1bn annually, or about 3.5 per cent of annual net 
current government expenditure. Implementation is now in train 
and, subject to conditions relating to changes in work practices 
and the like being fulfilled, the PSBB’s recommendations will 
have been fully delivered by early 2005. 
 
A curious feature of the PSBB’s report is that it furnished no 
specific justification for any of the pay increases it proposed. 
Instead, it provided a generalised rationale for its corpus of 
recommendations that echoed its terms of reference and cited a 
number of broad considerations. At no stage therefore did the 
PSBB indicate that its pay recommendations, either in general or 
in particular, arose because of a pay gap between the public and 
private sectors and the perceived need to bridge such a gap. In this 
respect the PSBB’s approach differed markedly from that of the 
Buckley Review Group, whose 2000 report contained explicit and 
unambiguous statements to the effect that salaries for top public 
service posts were substantially out of line with those of 
comparable positions in the private sector. 
 
Still, the impression that the PSBB’s research showed that the 
generality of public sector grades were underpaid relative to their 
private sector counterparts, and that such research results formed 
part of the rationale for the pay recommendations made by the 
PSBB, has been propagated by influential figures, including public 
sector trade-union leaders6. It is not possible to test the validity of 
 
6 For example, Peter McLoone, General Secretary of the IMPACT trade union, 
responded to the PSBB’s report by saying: “The outcome has vindicated IMPACT’s 
view that public service pay fell behind during the economic boom” (see the IMPACT 
website at www.impact.ie) The Executive Committee of another public service union, 
the Association of Higher Civil and Public Servants, responded as follows: “The 
independent Benchmarking Body has clearly established that public sector 
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these impressions since the PSBB’s research has not been 
published.  
 
One objective of this paper, therefore, is to examine the evidence 
on the extent of the pay gap between public and private sector 
workers at the time the PSBB’s research was carried out and how 
that gap evolved over the preceding years. Another objective is to 
situate the Irish evidence in the context of the international 
literature on this issue. To this end, we use a variety of 
econometric techniques to investigate the size, nature and 
dynamics of public-private sector pay differentials in Ireland 
during the 1994-2001 period, and to compare and contrast the Irish 
experience in this regard with the international experience.  
 
 
 
3. Some recent international findings 
 
To our knowledge, the kind of analysis we have undertaken has 
never before been carried out on Irish data. However, as noted 
above, a considerable volume of research along these lines has 
been undertaken for other countries. Good reviews of the literature 
and of the methodological issues that arise are contained in 
Gunderson (1998) and Gregory and Borland (1999). A brief 
summary of methodology and principal research findings follows. 
 
Ultimately, the question that the bulk of this research attempts to 
answer is whether employees who are identical in all material 
respects would earn more by working in the public than the private 
sector. The generic method used to address this question involves 
comparing the earnings of individual workers, controlling for 
differences in productivity-related characteristics and job 
attributes, across the two sectors. This typically involves 
estimating regression equations with some measure of earnings as 
the dependent variable, and with a set of explanatory variables 
designed to capture productivity-related personal attributes (such 
as age, experience and education) and job characteristics (such as 
                                                                                                                                 
remuneration is behind, and in some cases substantially behind, equivalent private 
sector remuneration and the fair rate for the job” (see the AHCPS website at 
www.ahcps.ie) 
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occupation, establishment size and nature of contract). These are 
sometimes referred to as Mincerean equations, after Jacob Mincer 
the economist who pioneered the analysis of earnings.  
 
The most basic application of this general approach is the single-
equation method. Typically an equation of the following form is 
estimated, using pooled data for public and private sector workers:  
 
iii
N
i
i PUBXW   
1
    (1)
  
where, Wi are individual earnings (usually in log form); Xi are 
variables describing personal attributes and job characteristics; 
PUB is a public-sector dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
the individual is a public sector employee and 0 otherwise; i is a 
random error term; and , i, and  are parameters. The parameter 
 is usually referred to as the “public-sector premium” if its value 
is positive and the “public-sector penalty” if its value is negative. 
Typically, this equation is estimated separately for males and 
females, although it can be estimated for males and females 
together in which case the X vector will include a gender variable. 
This equation may be separately estimated for different age strata, 
education attainment levels, occupations and so on. 
 
OLS regressions of this basic type differ from each other in terms 
of the precise combination of explanatory variables used. 
Variables measuring age, experience and education are included as 
a matter of course. However, there is some debate about the 
appropriateness of including occupational variables and variables 
reflecting establishment size. This debate helps to clarify the 
nature of the exercise in question. 
 
In relation to firm size, Gregory and Borland (1999) say: 
 
“Whether it is appropriate to include firm size as an 
explanatory variable depends on what job characteristics of 
a worker are regarded as fixed i.e. characteristics that 
would not change if the worker switched between public 
and private sectors. For example, if it is believed that a 
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worker observed in a job at a large-size firm will always 
work in a large-size firm, then it is appropriate to include 
firm size as an explanatory variable. On the other hand, if it 
is believed that a worker switching sectors enters a 
‘lottery’ where the probability of obtaining a job at a firm 
of a given size depends on the distribution of firm size in 
that sector, then firm size should not be included”. 
 
Melly (2002) summarises the debate in relation to occupational 
variables as follows: 
“It is appropriate to control for such occupational 
differences if they are indicative of what is necessary to do 
the job. However, if occupational titles are inflated in the 
public sector to justify high wages, then it is not 
appropriate to control for such occupational differences”. 
 
In the light of the kind of considerations referred to by these 
authors, many researchers do not take account of establishment 
size or occupational variables when analysing public-private 
earnings differentials. It is important to note that the exclusion of 
such variables can materially influence the research results. We 
return to this issue in greater detail when presenting our results for 
Ireland. 
 
OLS regressions are, of course, estimated at the mean. 
Accordingly, if the earnings variable is in log form, the results 
indicate that public sector employees, controlling for all the 
variables in X, are paid  per cent more or less (depending on 
whether the estimated coefficient  is positive or negative) than 
their private sector counterparts. In accord with convention, we 
label this coefficient the public-sector “premium” if its value is 
positive and  the “penalty” if its value is negative.  
 
However, if the distribution of earnings around the mean differs as 
between the two sectors, the OLS estimate of  will convey an 
incomplete picture of the differential. There are in fact solid a 
priori and empirical reasons for believing that the earnings 
distribution is more compressed in the public than the private 
sector. Motivated by this perception, a number of researchers have 
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used quantile regressions to analyse public-private sector pay 
differentials.  
 
Quantile regressions can be used to generate estimates of the 
public sector premium at different points along the wage 
distribution. Typically the points chosen are the 10th, 25th, 50th 
(median), 75th and 90th percentiles. Such estimates indicate 
whether there is a systematic variation in the public sector 
premium or penalty across the wage distribution.  
 
Gregory and Borland (1999) provide a comprehensive review of 
the empirical literature. Surveying research based on the dummy-
variable approach up to the mid-1990s, they note that a significant 
positive public-sector premium ranging from 3-11 per cent was 
found for a broad range of countries. Approaches based on 
Blinder-Oaxaca-type decomposition generally corroborated these 
findings, and indicated that public sector workers received higher 
returns to productivity-related characteristics than their private 
sector counterparts.  
 
Other common threads through the research reviewed by Gregory 
and Borland are that (i) the public sector premium tends to be 
higher for females than for males, and (ii) the premium tends to be 
higher for public sector employees at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution than for public sector employees at the top. Quantile 
regression analysis by Poterba and Reuben (1994) for the US, and 
by Blackaby, Murphy and O’Leary (1997) for the UK, indicate 
that the size of the public sector premium is inversely related to a 
worker’s position in the earnings distribution. A not uncommon 
finding of this strand of research is that, in the case of males, the 
public-sector premium moves from being substantially positive at 
the 10th percentile to a moderate penalty at the 90th.  
 
An interesting feature of the research surveyed by Gregory and 
Borland relates to the cyclicality of earnings in the two sectors: the 
cyclical component in earnings is larger for the private than for the 
public sector. A clear implication of this is that the average public 
sector premium is likely to be lower at the peak of the cycle (or, 
more generally, after a period of rapid economic growth) than at 
the trough. One might expect to find strong evidence of this 
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tendency in the Ireland of the 1990s, given the extraordinarily 
rapid growth experienced by the economy during this period.  
 
A considerable volume of research on public-private sector pay 
differentials has been undertaken in the period that has elapsed 
since Gregory and Borland’s review. Disney and Gosling (1998) 
use the British Household Panel Survey to estimate the premium 
for the UK for the period 1991 to 1995. Their OLS estimates 
produced a male premium of 4 per cent and a female premium of 
19 per cent. Perhaps their most intriguing results concerned the 
estimated effects of third-level education. Their OLS estimates 
yielded a penalty of over 9 per cent for third-level educated men 
but a premium of nearly 7 per cent for women.  
 
Jurges (2001), using the German Socio-Economic Panel, reports 
an average penalty of 3 per cent for men over the period 1984 to 
1996 and an average premium for women of 10 per cent. His 
quantile regression results reveal a familiar pattern with the returns 
for public-sector employees narrowing as one moves up the 
earnings distribution. His time series analysis echoes another 
conclusion of the earlier research reviewed by Gregory and 
Borland, namely a tendency for private sector pay to be more 
sensitive to the economic cycle.  
 
Melly (2002) also uses micro data to analyse public-private sector 
pay differentials in Germany in 2000. He finds a public sector 
penalty for men of 8 per cent on average and an average 9 per cent 
premium for women. Quantile regression analysis revealed a male 
premium ranging from 3 per cent at the 10th percentile to a penalty 
of 15 per cent at the 90th. In the case of women, the premium 
ranges from 17 per cent at the 10th percentile to zero at the 90th. 
Melly’s results indicate that the premium, for both men and 
women, declines with educational attainment, in other words, that 
the returns to education are higher in the private sector.  
 
Research by Lucifora and Meurs (2004) looks at the public sector 
premium in three European countries – France, Italy and the UK – 
using 1998 micro data. They employ two different specifications 
in their basic dummy-variable model which they estimated using 
OLS and quantile regression. In one specification they control for 
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personal attributes only (age, gender, education etc.); in the other 
they add job characteristics (occupation, part-time) and a regional 
variable. Not surprisingly, across all three jurisdictions, the 
estimated public-sector premium is lower in the latter 
specification, reflecting the greater explanatory power of a larger 
set of right-hand side variables. 
 
Their OLS estimates of the public-sector premium, using the 
broader specification, range form 4.9 per cent in the case of Italy 
to 6.4 per cent for the UK. Their quantile regression analysis 
produces a familiar pattern of results: in each country the premium 
declines monotonically from the bottom to the top of the earnings 
distribution, becoming negative (albeit statistically insignificant) 
in each case at the 90th percentile. Separate analysis for males and 
females produces another familiar result: the premium across all 
countries and all points of the earnings distribution is higher for 
women than for men.  
 
4. Description of the Irish data 
 
4.1 The sample 
 
The data used in our analysis are drawn from the Irish component 
of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), an EU-
wide project, co-ordinated by Eurostat. The ECHP is designed to 
produce a fully harmonised dataset relating to the social, financial 
and labour-market circumstances of households, based on 
longitudinal surveys. As such, the ECHP provides harmonised 
cross-sectional data for each year in which the survey is 
conducted, as well as longitudinal data that permit analysis of 
changes over time. The latest year for which ECHP data were 
available at the time of writing was 2001; the first year was 1994. 
For the 1994 survey a total of 9,900 individuals were interviewed. 
By 2001, attrition meant that less than half of this original group 
was interviewed. Our sample comprises a subset of the ECHP 
sample (Table 2). Since our interest is in comparing pay in the 
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public and private sectors7, we exclude those individuals who are 
not in the labour force and those who are unemployed. We also 
exclude those engaged in agriculture, forestry and fishing. Finally, 
we confine our analysis to employees; in other words, we exclude 
the self-employed. There are several reasons for so doing. The first 
is a reason based on principle, namely that self-employment is a 
materially different form of economic status from being an 
employee, not least in terms of dimensions like risk and security of 
employment. The second reason is a more pragmatic one: the 
quality of the earnings data that are available for the self-employed 
is questionable. In any event, most international studies of public-
private sector earnings differentials are confined to employees.  
 
Table 2: The sample size used in the analysis of Irish public-
private wage differentials, 1994-2001 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
ECHP sample 9,904 8,531 7,488 6,868 6,324 5,451 4,529 4,023 
Our sub-
sample 
3,246 2,582 2,225 2,099 2,173 1,888 1,673 1,494 
 
4.2 The dependent variable 
 
The ECHP dataset contains a considerable number of income 
variables. Many of these are too broad for our purposes since they 
include transfer payments and other forms of unearned income. 
Some of the earnings series are also too broad, since they include 
earnings from more than one job.  
 
Our analysis requires a gross earnings variable that relates only to 
principal occupation. The ECHP dataset offers just one such 
variable: gross monthly earnings. However, it is possible to 
construct a gross hourly earnings variable using the monthly data 
and an average weekly hours worked variable also reported. While 
an argument can be made for such an hourly measure, our 
judgement is that the monthly measure is the more meaningful of 
the two since the notion of an hourly wage has no relevance for a 
 
7 In classifying employees, the ECHP uses a broad definition of the public sector 
which includes civil servants, teachers, nurses, army personnel, Gardai, local authority 
workers, employees of semi-state bodies etc. 
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great many employees, and certainly not for the majority of 
managerial, professional and technical workers.  
 
Accordingly, we use gross monthly earnings in our core 
specification. However, we also test the impact of employing the 
hourly measure. Since average weekly hours worked are higher in 
the private sector, the gap in hourly earnings between the two 
sectors is wider than the gap in monthly earnings. 
 
A shortcoming of our earnings variable, common to other studies 
in this type, is that it excludes important elements of remuneration 
such as pension entitlements, benefits-in-kind and performance-
related pay. As far as the latter is concerned, there is a series in the 
ECHP dataset called ‘other earned income’, but it is a deficient 
measure of performance-related pay in that it includes lump-sum 
payments such as redundancy payments, back-dated pay increases 
and the like. There are no data in the ECHP relating to pension 
entitlements, so it is simply not possible to construct a measure of 
remuneration that incorporates the value of pensions. The same 
applies to benefits-in-kind. 
 
Of course, there are other dimensions of a job that, while not part 
of the remuneration package, are valued by employees. An 
obvious one, especially relevant to an analysis of public-private 
sector pay differentials, is job security. In general, public sector 
employment is more secure than private sector employment: the 
concept of ‘a job for life’ is much more prevalent in the public 
than the private sector, and the risk of losing one’s job is much 
lower. There is no way of adjusting our dependent variable to 
reflect this difference.  
 
 
 
 
4.3 The explanatory variables 
 
All the independent variables that are typically used in this kind of 
analysis are readily available in some form or other from the 
ECHP dataset. Respondents are asked their age, gender and 
marital status. These are straightforward and require no 
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elaboration. Respondents are also asked whether they suffer from 
any chronic disability and, since this is an obvious potential 
influence on productivity, we have used it as an independent 
variable. 
 
The education variable in Mincerean equations is usually either a 
‘completed years of education’ or a ‘highest level of education 
attained’ variable. The former is preferable on grounds of 
granularity. However, the ECHP data set does not yield a 
satisfactory variable of this type, so we have been constrained to 
use an attainment variable that distinguishes between three levels 
of completed education: lower second-level; upper second-level; 
and third-level (degree or other third-level qualification). In 
reporting our results below, these are designated as Level 1, Level 
2 and Level 3 respectively. Our education variable therefore, does 
not distinguish between different third-level qualifications and, 
since the span here is very wide (from certificates earned after a 
two-year course at an Institute of Technology to a Ph.D. earned 
after up to ten years study at a university), this is not entirely 
satisfactory. 
 
A work-experience variable is also typical in Mincerean equations. 
Conceptually, there are several options here, one being the total 
years worked by an individual across all employments (a measure 
of total work experience); another being years worked by an 
individual in his/her current employment (a measure of job-
specific experience). The Living in Ireland Survey (LIS), from 
which the ECHP is derived, yields data that allow a measure of the 
former type to be constructed. This is not the case with the ECHP 
data set. As a result, we are constrained to using a measure of the 
latter type, which is arguably inferior. However, given that we also 
use age as an explanatory variable, we do not think this poses a 
serious problem.  
 
The variables discussed so far - age, gender, marital status, 
disability, education and experience – reflect individuals’ 
productivity-related attributes. We have also used variables that 
relate to job characteristics: unit size; occupation; contract type 
and part-time status. As far as unit size is concerned, the ECHP 
contains information on the number of people working in the 
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establishment where the individual respondent is currently 
employed. The variable is stratified into six size ranges from less 
than three up to 500-plus. The contract-type variable distinguishes 
between permanent, fixed-term and casual contracts.  
 
As for occupation, we distinguish between the following 
categories: ‘managerial’ (including legislators and senior 
officials); ‘professional’; ‘technical’; ‘clerical’; ‘service’ 
(including sales workers); ‘craft’; ‘operatives’ (including assembly 
workers), and ‘elementary’ (including unskilled labourers). 
 
4.4 Differences between the sectors 
 
On average, the public servants in our sample are paid much more 
than the private-sector workers (Table 3). In terms of our chosen 
dependent variable, gross monthly earnings, public servants 
received €2778 on average in 2001, compared with an equivalent 
figure of €1905 for private sector workers, a differential of 46 per 
cent. In terms of the gross hourly earnings variable we have 
constructed, the differential is substantially larger, at almost 60 per 
cent. Average hourly earnings for public-sector workers are 
estimated at €18.23 in 2001, compared with €11.41 for private-
sector workers8. 
 
The corresponding differentials for earlier years were of a similar 
order of magnitude. For the 1994-2001 period, our data set 
suggests that public servants achieved an annual average increase 
in monthly earnings of 6 per cent, slightly more than the 5.8 per 
cent indicated for private sector employees. The equivalent rates 
of increase in average hourly earnings for the public and private 
sectors are 6.4 per cent and 6.6 per cent respectively. These figures 
suggest that over the medium to long term the ratio of raw 
earnings as between the two sectors in Ireland does not change 
very much, even if there are appreciable short-term fluctuations in 
that ratio. This echoes the findings of other researchers such as 
FitzGerald (2002) and Casey (2004).  
 
8 These figures imply that the average hourly earnings of public sector employees were 
almost 39% higher than the average for all employees in 2001. This is somewhat 
higher than the estimate of 34% arrived at by Casey (2004). 
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Table 3: Features of the data employed in the analysis of Irish 
public-private wage differentials, 1994 and 2001 
 
 1994 1994 2001 2001 
Variable Public Private Public Private 
Observations # 1,116 2,130 413 1,223 
Gross monthly earnings € 1,847.52 1,281.19 2,777.55 1,905.25 
Gross hourly earnings € 11.83 7.30 18.23 11.41 
Age Years 39.95 33.05 41.73 35.13 
Married % 0.718 0.488 0.685 0.488 
Male % 0.555 0.581 0.504 0.546 
Part-time % 0.148 0.116 0.094 0.136 
Disability % 0.080 0.075 0.056 0.067 
Level 3 Education 0.342 0.177 0.433 0.196 
Upper Level 2 Education 0.420 0.491 0.387 0.491 
Lower Level 2 Education 0.237 0.333 0.179 0.313 
Unit size 1-4 employees NA NA 0.061 0.121 
Unit size 5-19 employees NA NA 0.194 0.262 
Unit size 20-49 employees NA NA 0.206 0.218 
Unit size 50-99 employees NA NA 0.133 0.117 
Unit size 100-499 
employees 
NA NA 0.247 0.196 
Unit size 500+ employees NA NA 0.145 0.076 
Tenure <=3 years 0.242 0.454 0.288 0.602 
Tenure 4-8 years 0.134 0.270 0.153 0.179 
Tenure 9-13 years 0.143 0.098 0.114 0.074 
Tenure 14-18 years 0.002 0.000 0.087 0.051 
Tenure 19+ years 0.479 0.178 0.322 0.080 
Contract type : 
Permanent 
NA NA 0.891 0.866 
Contract type: Fixed NA NA 0.061 0.037 
Contract type: Casual NA NA 0.027 0.064 
Contract type: Other NA NA 0.022 0.033 
Occup. type: Managerial 0.037 0.066 0.068 0.093 
Occup. type: Professional 0.323 0.083 0.327 0.069 
Occup. type: Technical 0.116 0.088 0.143 0.098 
Occup. type: Clerical 0.186 0.143 0.186 0.153 
Occup. type: Service 0.118 0.174 0.126 0.196 
Occup. type: Craft 0.058 0.173 0.031 0.146 
Occup. type: Operative 0.060 0.163 0.051 0.169 
Occup. type: Elementary 0.101 0.110 0.068 0.076 
Source: ECHP, Ireland. 
 
On average, public sector workers in Ireland are older; more 
highly educated and have spent longer in their current job than 
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their private sector counterparts. They are also more likely to be 
married and more likely to be female. In these respects, the Irish 
pattern mirrors that of other countries where similar research has 
been carried out (see, for example, Lucifora and Meurs (2004) for 
data on France, Italy and the UK, and Melly (2002) for data on 
Germany). 
 
There are several other relevant dimensions along which Irish 
public sector and private sector workers are systematically 
different. Public sector workers are more likely to be employed on 
permanent or fixed-term contracts. They tend to work in larger 
entities: 39 per cent of public servants work in entities (local units) 
that employ 100 or more people; the corresponding proportion for 
the private sector is 27 per cent.  
 
Importantly, the occupational profiles of the two sectors are very 
different. Almost 33 per cent of all public sector workers are 
classified as ‘professional’, compared with less than 7 per cent of 
the private sector. Here the high proportion registered for the 
public sector reflects inter alia the classification of teachers.  At 
the other end of the occupational spectrum, 32 per cent of private 
sector workers fall into either the ‘craft’ or ‘operator’ categories, 
compared with just 8 per cent for the public sector. 
 
One other difference between the two sectors is worth noting at 
this stage. It relates to the distribution of earnings within each of 
the sectors. A priori, one would expect the distribution to be more 
compressed in the public than the private sector. This is what the 
international literature shows. It is also what our data set indicates 
for Ireland. The coefficient of variation in respect of average 
monthly earnings is consistently larger for the private than the 
public sector over the period 1994 through 2001 (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Coefficient of variation in public and private gross-
monthly earnings, 1994-2001 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Public 0.5283 0.4512 0.4562 0.4769 0.4811 0.5072 0.5590 0.5389 
Private 0.7126 0.7056 0.6477 0.6462 0.6339 0.6177 0.6164 0.5893 
Source: ECHP, Ireland. 
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However, in our sample, the coefficient of variation for the private 
sector declines substantially between 1994 and 2001, while it 
increases, albeit marginally, for the public sector over this period. 
Taking the two sectors together, our data set indicates that the 
coefficient of variation was considerably lower in 2001 than in 
1994. What all of this suggests is that the dispersion of employee 
earnings declined in the non-agricultural economy during the 
Celtic Tiger period and that this was more than fully accounted for 
by the reduced dispersion of private-sector earnings. 
 
Other researchers have uncovered similar evidence. For example, 
Barrett, FitzGerald and Nolan (2002) report a small reduction in 
earnings dispersion as measured by the ratio of the top to the 
bottom decile for the period 1994 to 1997, in marked contrast to 
the large increase in dispersion they found for the period 1987 to 
1994. They attribute the 1994-1997 pattern to immigration, which 
they argue was concentrated amongst skilled workers and thus 
augmented the supply of skilled workers relative to the supply of 
unskilled workers in the Irish economy. It is likely that a similar 
explanation applies to the period from 1997 through 2001 as well. 
 
5. The central results 
 
5.1 OLS regression results all employees 
 
We first present OLS regression results for 2001 (Table 5). These 
are typical of all years of our analysis. Two sets of results are 
presented; the first based on gross monthly earnings as the 
dependent variable, the second on gross hourly earnings. The 
coefficients on all the explanatory variables have the correct sign 
and, with few exceptions, are statistically significant. Earnings are 
positively correlated with age, education attainment, job 
experience and establishment size, and vary as expected across the 
occupational spectrum. Employees who are male and married, all 
other things equal, tend to earn more than others. Those on 
permanent contracts, all other things equal, earn more than those 
on fixed-term or casual contracts.  
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Table 5: OLS estimates of the wage equation, 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Monthly earnings Hourly earnings 
 Coefficient Standard 
Error* 
Coefficient Standard 
Error* 
Public sector 0.1298 (0.0243) 0.1636 (0.0234)
Age 0.0209 (0.0061) 0.0210 (0.0059)
Age squared -0.0002 (0.0001) -0.0002 (0.0001)
Male 0.2383 (0.0215) 0.1371 (0.0199)
Married 0.0783 (0.0251) 0.0813 (0.0251)
Part-time -0.6518 (0.0337) -0.0823 (0.0305)
Disability -0.0178 (0.0345) -0.0626 (0.0372)
Education level 3 0.3279 (0.0319) 0.3219 (0.0305)
Education level 2 0.1220 (0.0239) 0.1156 (0.0217)
Unit: 5-19 0.0416 (0.0358) 0.0678 (0.0363)
Unit: 20-49 0.0769 (0.0364) 0.1182 (0.0368)
Unit: 50-99 0.1301 (0.0404) 0.1580 (0.0406)
Unit: 100-499 0.1294 (0.0379) 0.1463 (0.0376)
Unti: 500+ 0.1761 (0.0435) 0.1904 (0.0439)
Tenure: 4-8 0.0915 (0.0247) 0.0836 (0.0233)
Tenure: 9-13 0.0934 (0.0363) 0.0515 (0.0357)
Tenure: 14-18 0.1555 (0.0374) 0.1334 (0.0379)
Tenure: 19+ 0.2254 (0.0347) 0.1934 (0.0334)
Management 0.3854 (0.0483) 0.3019 (0.0453)
Professional 0.3772 (0.0484) 0.4638 (0.0455)
Technical 0.2361 (0.0441) 0.2258 (0.0401)
Clerical 0.1204 (0.0402) 0.1154 (0.0359)
Service 0.0153 (0.0409) 0.0177 (0.0349)
Craft 0.2379 (0.0437) 0.2175 (0.0394)
Operative 0.1637 (0.0409) 0.1037 (0.0374)
Permanent 0.1597 (0.0380) 0.0997 (0.0326)
Fixed-term 0.1419 (0.0695) 0.0460 (0.0646)
Constant 6.3307 (0.1162) 1.2853 (0.1118)
R2  0.6493 0.5536
* Heteroskedastic robust standard errors. A complete set of results for the years 
1994 to 2001 is available by request from the authors. 
 
The estimate of the public-sector premium, using gross monthly 
wages as the dependent variable, is 13 per cent and highly 
significant. In other words, public sector workers in Ireland in 
2001 were, on average, paid 13 per cent more than private sector 
workers, conditioning on a wide array of productivity-related job 
and personal characteristics. The estimate of the public sector 
premium using gross hourly earnings is somewhat higher, at over 
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16 per cent, and also highly significant. These estimates are 
considerably higher than those reported by Lucifora and Meurs for 
France, Italy and the UK for 1998, by Melly for 2000 for 
Germany, and by Disney and Gosling for the UK for 1991-95 and 
1990-99. This, despite the fact that these authors use specifications 
that are likely to explain a smaller fraction of the raw public-
private earnings differential than ours.  
 
Table 6 sets out the estimates of the premium obtained for each of 
the years 1994 through 2001 using different specifications of the 
wage equation. Each specification uses gross monthly earnings as 
the dependent variable but a different set of explanatory variables. 
This exercise illuminates two aspects of the estimated public 
sector premium: (i) its sensitivity to the inclusion of certain 
explanatory variables, and (ii) its behaviour over time. We first 
explore the question of the sensitivity of the results to changes in 
specification. 
The specification labelled ‘Basic’ in the table contains the 
following explanatory variables: age, age squared, gender, marital 
status, education and experience, as well as dummy variables for 
part-time status and disability. This is the specification that is most 
typical of the one found in the international literature. To this basic 
equation we add serially the occupation variable, the contract-type 
variable, and the unit size variable.  
 
Table 6: Estimate of the public-sector premium (all employees) 
for various specifications of the wage equation, 1994-2001  
 
Equation 
type 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
0.1526 0.1693 0.1605 0.1281 0.1535 0.0960 0.1335 0.1398 Basic 
(0.0180
) 
(0.0188
) 
(0.0187
) 
(0.0198
) 
(0.0205
) 
(0.0219
) 
(0.0236
) 
(0.0245
) 
Basic + 
Occupatio
n 
0.1407 
(0.0174
) 
0.1509 
(0.0184
) 
0.1471 
(0.0186
) 
0.1215 
(0.0194
) 
0.1407 
(0.0205
) 
0.0905 
(0.0211
) 
0.1200 
(0.0231
) 
0.1398 
(0.0250
) 
0.1599 0.1521 0.1300 0.1625 0.1027 0.1398 0.1442 Basic + 
Contract 
Type 
NA 
(0.0187
) 
(0.0188
) 
(0.0195
) 
(0.0204
) 
(0.0218
) 
(0.0235
) 
(0.0245
) 
NA NA NA 0.1049 0.1325 0.0769 0.1106 0.1257 Basic + 
Unit Size    (0.0192
) 
(0.0199
) 
(0.0215
) 
(0.0232
) 
(0.0240
) 
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Extended* 0.1407 0.1460 0.1418 0.0995 0.1336 0.0831 0.1080 0.1298 
 (0.0174
) 
(0.0183
) 
(0.0185
) 
(0.0183
) 
(0.0199
) 
(0.0207
) 
(0.0221
) 
(0.0243
) 
* The coefficients of the ‘extended’ equation are not comparable across the full 
period – see text for discussion. 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. Complete regression results are 
available on request from the authors. 
 
The inclusion of the occupation variable has the effect of reducing 
the estimated public sector premium in each year except 2001, 
typically by about 1-1.5 per cent points. The inclusion of contract 
type has the effect of reducing the estimated premium for the years 
1995 and 1996, but has the opposite effect in each subsequent 
year. The contract-type variable could not be included for either 
sector for 1994 because the relevant data were not collected for 
that year. The unit-size variable could only be included from 1997, 
since the relevant data were not collected for the public sector in 
either 1995 or 1996 and no data on unit size were collected for 
1994. Once included, the unit-size variable has the effect of 
substantially reducing the estimated premium, typically by more 
than 1.5 per cent points. 
 
Comparing the coefficients listed in the first and last rows of Table 
6 from 1997 reveals that the overall effect of including all three 
variables, as we do in the ‘extended’ equation, is to reduce the 
estimated premium for each year. For instance, in 2001, our 
estimate of the premium would be 14 per cent rather than 13 per 
cent, had we omitted all three variables from our equation.    
 
It is important to note that the coefficients estimated for the 
extended equation are not comparable across the full 1994-2001 
period. This is because both the unit-size and contract-type 
variables are excluded from this specification for 1994 and the 
unit-size variable is excluded for 1995 and 1996. The coefficients 
estimated for the extended model are however comparable across 
the years 1997 through 2001. For this sub-period, there is no 
discernible trend in the premium, although it does fluctuate 
considerably from year to year. Of some interest, in light of the 
tightening of labour market conditions that occurred, is the fact 
that the 2001 premium is bigger than the 1997 premium, though 
not by a statistically significantly margin. 
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To examine the behaviour of the public-sector premium over a 
longer span we have to use one of the specifications that is 
correspondingly time-consistent. Both the basic specification and 
the basic specification augmented by the occupational variable 
permit us to compare the premium over the full 1994-2001 period. 
In the former case there is some suggestion of a decline in the 
premium, but the difference between the estimates for 1994 and 
2001 is not statistically significant. In the latter case, the premium 
estimated for 1994 is virtually identical to that estimated for 2001. 
Again, given the tightening of labour market conditions that 
occurred over this time frame, and the widespread belief that this 
had lowered earnings in the public sector relative to the private 
sector, this is a noteworthy result.    
 
5.2 OLS regression results: interaction effects 
 
A disadvantage of the simple dummy-variable approach is that 
estimated differences between the two sectors are confined to the 
intercept term; in other words that returns to productivity-related 
personal attributes and job characteristics are constrained to be the 
same across the two sectors. One way of mitigating this limitation 
is to run regressions where the public sector dummy is allowed 
interact with various explanatory variables. This can be done with 
any or all of the explanatory variables. Here, we report on the 
results of two such exercises where the public sector dummy 
variable is interacted with the gender and education variables 
respectively. Otherwise, the specification of the equations is 
exactly as above: in particular, these equations are based on the 
specification that includes the full set of explanatory variables and 
uses gross monthly earnings as the dependent variable (the 
extended specification). 
 
The results in respect of gender are summarised in Table 7. The 
second row contains the estimated public sector premium for 
women. We include the estimated premium for all employees in 
the first row to facilitate the interpretation of the results. The third 
row shows the estimated difference between the premium for 
women and the premium for men. The premium for women is 
positive and highly statistically significant throughout the period 
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under review. It is also larger than the premium estimated for all 
employees together. The premium estimated for men is 
consistently smaller than that estimated for women throughout the 
period (this is indicated by the negative co-efficient on the male-
female difference given in the table). However, and this is a very 
important qualification, the female co-efficient is in a statistical 
sense significantly different from the total population co-efficient 
only for the 1994-1997 sub-period and the male-female difference 
is only statistically significant for the years 1994 through 1998. In 
other words, for the most recent years, our analysis indicates that 
the premium enjoyed by female employees in the public sector is 
not significantly different from that enjoyed by their male 
counterparts.  
 
These are striking results. The findings in respect of the earlier 
years are in line with the international experience; the findings for 
the later years are not. The overall results suggest that something 
happened to change relative gender premiums around the turn of 
the century. What this might have been is beyond the scope of this 
paper to identify conclusively. It has been speculated in the 
international literature that the existence of a bigger public sector 
premium for women than men may reflect the more punctilious 
observance of gender equality legislation by public than private 
sector employers. It may be, therefore, that the decline in the 
significance of the relative female premium that we have estimated 
for Ireland may reflect the increasingly conscientious application 
of equality legislation by private sector employers. Another 
possible explanation, at least as far as 2000 and 2001 are 
concerned, is the introduction of the minimum wage, to the extent 
that female employees in the private sector benefited more than 
other groups.   
 
Table 7: Estimates of the public-sector premium by gender, 
1994-2001 
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 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
0.1407 0.1460 0.1418 0.0995 0.1336 0.0831 0.1080 0.1298 All 
employees (0.0174) (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0183) (0.0199) (0.0207) (0.0221) (0.0243) 
0.1950 0.1989 0.2065 0.1417 0.1646 0.1114 0.1341 0.1448 Females 
(0.0247) (0.0264) (0.0256) (0.0246) (0.0256) (0.0266) (0.0287) (0.0298) 
Male-
Female 
difference 
-0.0963 
(0.0296) 
-0.0926 
(0.0309) 
-0.1151 
(0.0303) 
-0.0751 
(0.0302) 
-0.0567 
(0.0310) 
-0.053 
(0.0338) 
-0.0511 
(0.0368) 
-0.0304 
(0.0407) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Complete regression results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
Turning to education, the results are summarised in Table 8. 
Public servants with Level 1 education consistently achieved a 
substantial and statistically significant earnings premium vis-à-vis 
their private sector counterparts throughout the period. The 
estimated premiums for those with Level 2 education are 
somewhat different: in some years higher, in some years lower. 
Critically, however, the difference between the premiums 
estimated in respect of Level 1 and Level 2 education is not 
statistically significant in any year. The estimated premiums for 
those with third-level qualifications evince a different pattern 
again: higher than the Level 1 premium for every year except 
1999, but by a statistically significant amount in only two years: 
1994 and 1998. Another perspective on this analysis is provided 
by comparing the estimates of the premium for those with Level 1 
education with the estimates for all employees: the difference 
between the respective coefficients is not statistically significant in 
any of the years 1994 through 2001.  
 
Table 8: Estimates of the public-sector premium by 
educational attainment, 1994-2001 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
All 
employees 
0.1407 
(0.0174) 
0.1460 
(0.0183) 
0.1418 
(0.0185) 
0.0995 
(0.0183) 
0.1336 
(0.0199) 
0.0831 
(0.0207) 
0.1080 
(0.0221) 
0.1298 
(0.0243) 
Level 1 0.1005 
(0.0281) 
0.1462 
(0.0321) 
0.1237 
(0.0315) 
0.1044 
(0.0313) 
0.0956 
(0.0318) 
0.0915 
(0.0355) 
0.0907 
(0.0404) 
0.0967 
(0.0464) 
Level 2-
Level 1 
difference 
-0.0166 
(0.0350) 
-0.0287 
(0.0379) 
0.0023 
(0.0378) 
-0.0215 
(0.0373) 
0.0167 
(0.0387) 
-0.0023 
(0.0440) 
0.0049 
(0.0481) 
0.0471 
(0.0541) 
Level 3-
Level 1 
difference 
0.1896 
(0.0414) 
0.0488 
(0.0449) 
0.0627 
(0.0452) 
0.0157 
(0.0452) 
0.0875 
(0.0452) 
-0.0218 
(0.0472) 
0.0423 
(0.0525) 
0.0370 
(0.0602) 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. Complete regression results are 
available on request from the authors.  
 
Overall, therefore, our analysis suggests that the returns to 
education in Ireland are not materially different as between the 
private and public sectors. This contrasts with the findings 
reported in the international literature. Poterba and Reuben (1994), 
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Disney and Gosling (1998 and 2003)9 and Melly (2002) each 
report results indicating that the returns to education are 
significantly lower in the public than the private sector. This is an 
aspect of our findings that requires further investigation. It may be 
that a more refined measure of education attainment would yield 
results closer to the international norm in this respect. 
 
5.3 Quantile regression results 
 
OLS regressions are estimated at the mean. If, as already noted, 
public sector and private sector earnings are distributed differently 
around their respective means, OLS estimates of the public sector 
premium will tell an incomplete story. Our basic statistical 
analysis of the raw data does suggest that the two distributions are 
materially different. Specifically, the distribution of earnings is 
significantly more compressed in the public than the private 
sector, as is the case in all other jurisdictions where similar 
research has been conducted. 
 
In Table 9 we present estimates of the premium that are generated 
by regressions at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles, for 
each of the years 1994 through 2001. The estimate of the public-
sector premium is evidently not constant across the earnings 
distribution. In 2001, for instance, the public-sector premium is 
estimated at 17 per cent at the 10th percentile, falls to a range in the 
vicinity of 8-9 per cent at the 75th and 90th percentiles10. This 
pattern is broadly in line with the pattern that has been 
documented for other countries. It indicates that the margin by 
which public sector workers earn more than their private sector 
counterparts, again controlling for all productivity-related 
variables included in the model, is greatest for low-paid workers 
and is smallest for employees at the top of the wage distribution. 
 
Does our analysis yield evidence of a public sector penalty at any 
point on the earnings distribution? Well, we have estimated 
 
9 Disney and Gosling’s 1998 paper reports a 3rd-level penalty for public-sector men 
but a premium for women. Their 2003 paper, however, using a more extended dataset 
and an IV estimator to counter potential selection bias, indicates a premium for third-
level educated men and women of 13 per cent and 17 per cent respectively.  
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quantile regressions at the 95th percentile and these show that the 
public sector premium is not statistically significant at that point 
for any year except 1994. Carrying out quantile regressions at 
points of the distribution higher than this is problematic because 
the standard errors become increasingly large. We can only 
surmise that at a point of the earnings distribution above the 95th 
percentile significant public sector penalties exist, as documented 
by the Buckley Review Group. 
  
 
 
Table 9: Estimates of the public-sector premium across the 
wage distribution, 1994-2001 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
OLS 0.1407 0.1460 0.1418 0.0995 0.1336 0.0831 0.1080 0.1298 
(Mean) (0.0174) (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0183) (0.0199) (0.0207) (0.0221) (0.0243) 
0.1740 0.2574 0.2293 0.1656 0.2092 0.1480 0.1320 0.1688 10% 
percentile (0.0376) (0.0440) (0.0322) (0.0310) (0.0361) (0.0298) (0.0351) (0.0457) 
0.1719 0.1705 0.1592 0.1584 0.1791 0.1387 0.1319 0.1474 25% 
percentile (0.0223) (0.0269) (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0246) (0.0260) (0.0252) (0.0322) 
0.1179 0.1366 0.1315 0.0966 0.1319 0.0724 0.0772 0.1164 50% 
(Median) (0.0161) (0.0223) (0.0189) (0.0202) (0.0194) (0.0221) (0.0206) (0.0311) 
0.0930 0.0865 0.0931 0.0686 0.0948 0.0183 0.0895 0.0863 75% 
percentile (0.0182) (0.0203) (0.0206) (0.0230) (0.0226) (0.0271) (0.0286) (0.0267) 
0.0820 0.0494 0.0604 0.0161 0.0719 0.0039 0.0656 0.0941 90% 
percentile (0.0269) (0.0340) (0.0252) (0.0307) (0.0328) (0.0380) (0.0434) (0.0451) 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. Complete regression results are 
available on request from the authors.  
 
We have already noted that the degree of dispersion of public-
sector earnings increased between 1994 and 2001, both in absolute 
terms and relative to the private sector. In other words, while the 
public sector wage distribution remained more compressed than 
the private sector distribution towards the end of this period, the 
margin by which it did so was narrower than in the early part of 
the period. Thus, we might expect to discover that the public-
sector premium declined more precipitately as one travelled up the 
earnings’ distribution in the early years of the period than in the 
later years. The estimates of the premium generated by the 
quantile regressions offer some support for this expectation. 
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6. Robustness checks – potential estimation biases 
 
Estimates of wage differentials are potentially afflicted by a 
number of sources of bias, namely, sample selection bias 
conditional on observed right-hand-side explanatory variables; 
specification bias driven by unobservable variables relating to 
productivities, tastes and sector-specific factors; endogeneity bias; 
and bias arising from measurement error. In this section we 
explore the possible impact of these sources of bias on the estimate 
of the public-sector premium. 
 
 
6.1 Sample selection bias 
 
Valid estimates of public-private sector wage differentials require 
that comparisons be made on a like-for-like basis. Leaving aside 
the issue of potential unobservable variables that we consider 
below, we examine here whether, given the sample of observations 
and variables available to us, we can generate a valid set of 
comparisons between individuals employed in the public and 
private sectors. We address this question by utilising the method of 
“propensity scores” (see Conniffe, Gash and O’Connell, 2000). 
 
This method comprises two steps. In the first step we estimate a 
probit model where the dependent variable is the public-sector 
dummy and the regressors are the set as employed in the previous 
section. The results of estimating the probit model for 2000 are 
given in Table 10. (Essentially similar findings are obtained for 
the other years in our analysis and are available from the authors 
upon request.) We observe positive and significant coefficients for 
age, third-level education, length of tenure in employment, 
professional occupational status and unit size. Therefore 
individuals that have a higher probability of being employed in the 
public sector (that is, those with a higher propensity score), tend to 
be older, better educated, of professional employment status, 
working in a larger unit and have been working in current job 
longer than persons with lower propensity scores. Lower scores 
are associated with occupations such as management, craft and 
operators. These results are consistent for all years. We obtain a 
pseudo R2 of 0.261 in 2000 and this is similar each year. 
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Table 10: Probit estimates for public-sector status, Ireland, 
2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
   
Age 0.0164 (0.0045) 
Male -0.0857 (0.0874) 
Married 0.0047 (0.0967) 
Part-time -0.0104 (0.1296) 
Disability -0.0192 (0.1643) 
Education level 3 0.3824 (0.1330) 
Education level 2 0.1592 (0.1064) 
Tenure: 4-8 0.4228 (0.1113) 
Tenure: 9-13 0.5787 (0.1350) 
Tenure: 14-18 1.0279 (0.1584) 
Tenure: 19+ 1.1860 (0.1282) 
Unit: 5-19 0.0616 (0.1564) 
Unit: 20-49 0.2359 (0.1601) 
Unit: 50-99 0.2828 (0.1750) 
Unit: 100-499 0.3978 (0.1573) 
Unti: 500+ 0.6656 (0.1754) 
Management -0.6240 (0.2009) 
Professional 0.5423 (0.1846) 
Technician -0.0793 (0.1811) 
Clerk 0.1435 (0.1686) 
Service -0.1012 (0.1677) 
Craft -0.9353 (0.2047) 
Operator -0.6029 (0.1806) 
Permanent -0.1508 (0.2316) 
Fixed 0.4844 (0.2786) 
Casual 0.0849 (0.2877) 
Constant -1.8852 (0.3381) 
   
Log likelihood = -719.82443  
Pseudo R2 = 0.2610  
Note: standard errors are heteroskedastic robust. Complete regression results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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In the second step we rank the propensity scores and divide the 
observations into 10 equal strata, with the lowest 10% of the 
propensity scores in the first strata and the second 10% in the 2nd 
strata and so on. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that 
the distribution of the observable characteristics will be same 
within each strata. Therefore if one stratum is comprised of all 
private-sector workers then there are no similar public-sector 
workers to compare them with so these observations need to be 
omitted from the regression sample. As a working rule, we 
decided to omit a stratum of observations if it contained fewer than 
20 individuals from either the public or private sectors. In the 
years 1997 to 2000, this rule resulted in the first three strata (30% 
of our observations) being omitted from our regression sample; in 
1996 we omitted the first two strata; and in 1994 and 1995 we 
excluded the first strata. Our ‘extended’ wage specification was 
then re-run for all years on this truncated dataset and the resulting 
premium estimates are given in Table 11. 
  
As is apparent the results from the truncated sample are very 
similar in all years and they are not significantly different in any 
year. This would imply that sample selection bias, conditional on 
observable right-hand-side variables, is not an issue with our data.  
 
Table 11: Public-sector premium estimates for the ‘complete’ 
sample and the ‘truncated’ sample generated by the 
propensity score method, Ireland, 1994-2000 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
0.1407 0.1460 0.1418 0.0995 0.1336 0.0831 0.1080 Complete 
sample (0.0170) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0196) (0.0209) (0.0227) 
0.1489 0.1479 0.1389 0.0999 0.1406 0.0840 0.1078 Truncated 
sample (0.0171) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0202) (0.0217) (0.0228) 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. Complete regression results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
6.2 Specification, measurement error and endogeneity bias 
 
 33 
To the extent that workers, due to unobservable talents or tastes, 
select themselves into particular sectors these factors will have an 
impact on the estimated public-sector premium. Thus it could be 
that part of the effect we’re capturing in the estimated premium 
arises from an unobserved productivity or taste variable. Hence the 
OLS estimate of the premium would be an overestimate of the true 
premium. It is important therefore to assess the potential 
importance of this factor.  
 
The panel feature of our data allows us to use individual-worker 
dummy variables as a proxy for possible unobservable factors. The 
application of the fixed-effects estimator to our extended wage 
model implies that the unobservable factors are unchanged over 
time and that the returns to these unobservable factors are similar 
for public and private sector workers.  
 
Given these assumptions, the application of the fixed-effects 
estimator will yield an estimate of the premium that will be 
determined by those employees that move sector over the seven 
years of our panel. (A non-zero coefficient could also be generated 
by the presence of a differential wage growth between the public 
and private sectors over the seven-year period. This possibility is 
tested below.) This raises a number of issues that impinge on the 
assessment of the resulting estimate of the premium. It seems 
reasonable that the potential problems of both measurement error 
and endogeneity bias will tend to be exacerbated with the fixed-
effects estimator. The presence of both of these biases will tend to 
bias the fixed-estimator towards zero which will operate to offset 
the upward bias due to omitted unobservable variables that afflict 
the cross-sectional regressions. But, as Disney and Gosling (2003) 
persuasively argue, there is no strong reason to suppose, as does 
Freeman (1984), that OLS will provide an upward bound and the 
fixed-effects estimator a lower bound estimate of the premium. 
 
In the presence of both measurement error and endogeneity bias 
the appropriate estimator would be instrumental variables (IVs). 
As always obtaining IVs with the requisite properties is never 
easy. Fortunately the ECHPS contains some qualitative variables 
that could serve as potential IVs. One in particular looks 
promising, namely, workers’ satisfaction levels in response to a 
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question on job security. Responses classified by public and 
private-sector employees for a number of years data are shown in 
Table 12. These data show that there is a strong correlation 
between “job security” satisfaction levels and public-sector status.  
 
Table 12: Satisfaction levels with job security in the public and 
private sectors, Ireland, 1994-2000 
Note: ECHPS, Ireland. 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Satisfaction 
level 
% % % % 
 Public Private Public Private Public Private Public  Private 
1 8.46 10.91 3.5 5.82 3.83 3.76 1.55 2.18 
2 4.53 8.62 2.43 6.49 2.19 5.28 1.81 4.05 
3 6.2 15.27 4.71 11.73 2.19 9.85 3.1 6.34 
4 9.45 17.67 7.45 18.89 9.49 16.41 6.98 17.36 
5 20.18 21.92 22.95 30.12 19.34 29.94 20.16 32.95 
6 51.18 25.63 58.97 26.96 62.96 34.75 66.41 37.11 
 
With this variable as an instrument we estimated the wage 
equation for the balanced panel using 2SLS. In the first stage we 
regressed the public-sector status dummy on the “job security” 
satisfaction variable and all of the other right-hand-side variables 
in the extended wage equation. We then generated the predicted 
values for the public-sector status dummy and used this variable 
instead of the original variable in the estimation of the wage 
equation and the public-sector premium. 
  
Table 13 presents various estimates of the premium that were 
obtained using the panel dataset. We first compare our OLS 
estimates of the premium for the balanced panel with the average 
value of the estimate obtained for the seven years from the 
unbalanced panel. The results are broadly similar which gives us 
some confidence that panel attrition does not appear of itself to be 
associated with any noticeable biases. 
 
The fixed-effects estimator yields a substantially lower premium 
than the OLS estimator. On the face of it, this suggests that the 
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OLS estimates are subject to a sizeable upward bias due to omitted 
variables. We estimated separate models for men and women 
which produced very similar estimates of the premium but the 
women’s premium was not statistically significant (Annex 8). We 
also allowed the premium estimate to vary over time which 
revealed a pronounced downward trend over the period from 1994 
to 2000. 
 
Table 13: OLS, fixed-effects and fixed-effects and 2SLS 
estimates of the public-sector premium, Ireland, 1994-2000 
 
Estimator Premium 
estimate 
OLS average annual (unbalanced panel)* 0.1218 
(0.0195) 
OLS balanced panel 0.1472 
(0.0120) 
Fixed-effects 0.0474 
(0.0211) 
Fixed-effects and 2SLS 0.1296 
(0.0540) 
* The simple average (1994-2000) of the premium estimates generated by the 
‘extended’ specification of the wage equation in Table 6. 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. Complete regression results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
The combination of the fixed-effects and the IV estimator reveals 
an estimate of the premium that is quite close to the OLS estimate. 
This suggests that the fixed-effects and OLS estimators are both 
subject to a substantial downward bias due to a possible 
combination of measurement error and endogeneity bias. Taking 
the fixed-effects and fixed-effects-2SLS estimators together 
suggests that the positive bias that probably arises due to the 
omission of important variables is more than offset by the negative 
biases that are potentially generated by measurement error and 
endogeneity. All in all therefore we feel that our results provide 
reasonable grounds for attesting to the robustness of the OLS 
estimates. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
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Irish public sector employees are on average much better paid than 
their private sector counterparts. The ECHP dataset that we have 
used for the analysis presented in this paper indicates that the 
margin in the year 2001 was 46 per cent when measured in terms 
of average gross monthly earnings, the measure we consider to be 
the most appropriate of those available. 
 
This differential is very large but of limited relevance. In 
particular, it does not necessarily mean that pay is higher in the 
public sector on a like-for-like basis. The reason is that public 
servants are typically better endowed than private sector 
employees with the kind of attributes that attract higher pay: they 
tend to be older, more experienced and better educated; they also 
tend to work in more highly-skilled jobs and in bigger 
establishments. 
 
The key question addressed in our paper, therefore, is whether 
public sector workers in Ireland are paid more than private sector 
employees, when such differences in productivity-related personal 
attributes and job characteristics are controlled for, in other words 
whether a public-sector premium exists. The answer is clear and 
unambiguous. We estimate that in 2001, the latest year for which 
we have completed our analysis, the premium enjoyed by public 
servants was about 13 per cent, on the basis of gross monthly 
earnings.  
 
We have analysed whether and how this premium varies with 
gender, with educational attainment, and across the earnings 
distribution. In summary, what we have found is that the public 
sector premium is significantly bigger for those near the bottom of 
the earnings distribution than for those near the top, was 
significantly bigger for women than men in the mid-1990s but not 
at the end of the 1990s, and does not vary significantly across 
different levels of educational attainment. 
 
We have also analysed whether and how the public sector 
premium changed between 1994 and 2001. This was a period of 
exceptionally rapid output and employment growth, and 
correspondingly sharp tightening of labour market conditions in 
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the Irish economy. On the basis of international evidence, it might 
be expected that in such circumstances the intense competition 
amongst employers for a declining pool of available workers 
would have pushed up earnings in the private sector more quickly 
than in the public sector, resulting in a contraction of the public 
sector premium. Our research uncovers no compelling evidence 
that this was in fact the case: we estimate the premium for 2001 to 
be not significantly different from that estimated for 1994. 
 
Some of our results are consistent with the research findings for 
other countries. In particular, our finding that the public sector 
premium declines with the level of earnings is in keeping with the 
international pattern. In contrast, our findings that female public 
servants no longer enjoy a significantly bigger premium than their 
male counterparts, and that the public sector premium for those 
that have completed third-level education is not significantly 
different from the premium enjoyed by early school-leavers, run 
counter to the international evidence. 
 
However, the most remarkable difference between our results and 
those of other researchers relates to the absolute size of the 
premium. The public sector premium we have estimated for 
Ireland is high by international standards. At 13 per cent for 2001, 
it compares with corresponding estimates in the range 4-6 per cent 
for France, Italy and the UK, using 1998 data (our Irish estimate 
for 1998 is also around 13 per cent). This contrast is all the more 
notable given that we use a specification that would tend to 
produce a lower estimate of the premium than the specification 
used in most of the published international literature with which 
we are familiar. It is also worth pointing out that our estimate for 
Ireland predates the substantial boost to public-sector wages and 
salaries that flowed from the so-called ‘benchmarking’ process.  
 
Our paper leaves a number of important questions unanswered. 
Probably the most important is: why is our estimated public sector 
premium for Ireland so large? One possibility is that our estimates 
are biased upwards because of flaws in our methodology. For 
example, we may have omitted important explanatory variables, or 
the sample we have used may be biased – an important possibility 
to check for given the attrition in the ECHP panel over the 1994-
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2001 period. We have carried out a range of rigorous robustness 
checks to establish whether this might be the case, and we are 
reasonably confident that our estimates are not materially affected 
by such biases. That being the case, the question remains: why, on 
a like-for-like basis, are Irish public-sector employees paid so 
much more than their private-sector counterparts?  
 
One possible explanation, a variant of the omitted variables 
argument, has to do with the deficiencies in our measure of 
earnings. Recall that the variable we use falls well short of being a 
comprehensive measure of remuneration, excluding as it does 
benefits-in-kind, performance-related pay and the value of pension 
entitlements. Of course, it also fails to take account of different 
rates of PRSI contribution (most public servants make lower PRSI 
contributions than their private sector counterparts) and the value 
of the greater security that typically attaches to public sector jobs. 
However, the problem with an explanation along these lines is 
that, if all of these factors were taken into account, it is likely that 
the estimated public sector premium would rise rather than fall, 
except perhaps in the upper reaches of the earnings distribution.  
 
Another possible explanation is that certain public sector workers 
require compensation for the hazardous, stressful and/or 
unpleasant nature of the work they do. This type of argument is 
often advanced in the discussion of the pay of groups like prison 
officers, Gardai, teachers and nurses. However, it is not entirely 
persuasive for at least two reasons. First, hazardous, stressful or 
unpleasant work is not peculiar to the public sector. There are also 
a great many private sector employees who have to endure such 
working conditions. Second, unless there is reason to believe that 
the incidence of hazardous, stressful and unpleasant working 
conditions is greater in public service employment in Ireland than 
elsewhere, the argument does not explain why the public sector 
premium is so much higher in Ireland than in other jurisdictions. 
 
The notion that a large premium for public sector employees can 
persist is an uncomfortable one for classically-trained economists, 
since it suggests that markets are not functioning properly. If 
markets were functioning properly, private sector workers would 
compete for better-paying public sector jobs to the point where the 
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public sector premium would disappear. Herein lies another 
possible explanation. The fact that a large premium persists may 
be indicative of market failures such as information deficiencies, 
skill mismatches and barriers to entry. The argument here is that 
some combination of these factors may effectively prevent private 
sector workers from competing for more lucrative public sector 
positions, except across a limited range of recruitment grades. 
 
Even this explanation, despite its intellectual appeal, is incomplete 
however. It may shed light on why a public sector premium 
persists but, in itself, it does not explain why (i) the premium in 
Ireland is so much higher than elsewhere, or (ii) why the Irish 
premium was maintained at such a high level through a period 
characterised by the type of labour market conditions that might 
have been expected to cause it to decline. An obvious area to 
explore for answers to these questions is the wage bargaining 
framework that was in place during this period. 
 
A full exploration of this area is outside the scope of this paper. 
That said, an obvious hypothesis suggests itself. It is that Ireland’s 
social partnership model, and in particular the enormous value that 
politicians and policy-makers attached to it, conferred on Irish 
public sector trade unions greater bargaining power than they 
would otherwise have had (and greater bargaining power than 
their international counterparts typically enjoyed). According to 
this hypothesis, public sector trade unions were thus enabled to 
more effectively preserve barriers to entry, and more successfully 
pursue pay claims that matched the increases taking place across 
the private sector during the Celtic Tiger period. 
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